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Supreme Court Docket No. 
Minidoka County Case No. 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
38199-2010 
CV-2010-79 
Appealed from the district Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho 
in and for Minidoka County 
Honorable MICHAEL R. CRABTREE, District Judge 
Lawrence Wasden, IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID. 83720 
Attorney for Respondent, STATE OF IDAHO 
Molly J. Huskey, IDAHO ST ATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 
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Attorney for Appellant, JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA 
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f::"ffh Judicial District Court - Minidoka Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0000079 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
2/5/2010 NCPC JANET New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief - Petition 
and affidvait for post-conviction relief 
JANET Filing: H 1 O - Post-conviction act proceedings 
Paid by: Zepeda, Jose Luis Jr. (subject) Receipt 
number: 0001083 Dated: 2/10/2010 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: Zepeda, Jose Luis Jr. (subject) 
MOTN JANET Motion and affidavit in support for appointment of 
counsel 
MOTN JANET Motion and affidavit for permission to proceed on 
partial payment of court fees (prisoner) 
2/10/2010 CHJG JANET Change Assigned Judge 
2/19/2010 ORPD JANET Plaintiff: Zepeda, Jose Luis Jr. Order Appointing 
Public Defender Court appointed Daniel S. Brown 
ORDR JANET Order granting motion for appointment of counsel 
3/3/2010 ANSW SANTOS Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
3/4/2010 HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
03/29/2010 09:00 AM) 
NOTC JANET Notice OF HEARING 
3/29/2010 HRVC JANET Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
03/29/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
4/2/2010 HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/19/2010 09:00 
AM) Motion for Status 
NOTC JANET Notice of hearing 
4/5/2010 MOTN SANTOS Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
4/6/2010 MOTN JANET Motion for status conference 
NOTC JANET Notice of hearing 
4/7/2010 ORDR SANTOS ExParte Order for Payment $137.50 
4/13/2010 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment 
4/16/2010 ORDR SANTOS ExParte Order for Payment $110.00 
4/19/2010 CMIN JANET Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/19/2010 
Time: 9:50 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland 
Tape Number: 
Party: Jose Zepeda, Attorney: Daniel Brown 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson 
(10 minutes - printed) 
MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment 
INHD JANET Hearing result for Motion held on 04/19/2010 
09:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held Motion for 
Status 
4/23/2010 ORDR SANTOS ExParte Orderfor Payment $110.00 
User: SANTOS 
Judge 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
VI 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Date: 11/9/2010 
Time: 09:35 AM 
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F" h Judicial District Court - Minidoka Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0000079 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: SANTOS 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
4/27/2010 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
4/30/2010 ORDR SANTOS ExParte Order for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
5/10/2010 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
5/14/2010 ORDR SANTOS Ex Parte Order for Payment $165.00 Michael R. Crabtree 
7/7/2010 MOTN JANET Motion for summary dismissal and brief in support Michael R. Crabtree 
7/12/2010 MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
ORDR JANET Scheduling Order regarding state's motion for Michael R. Crabtree 
summary dismissal 
7/15/2010 MISC JANET Objection Michael R. Crabtree 
7/16/2010 ORDR JANET Ex-Parte Order for payment ($478.50) Michael R. Crabtree 
7/19/2010 MOTN SANTOS Ex-Parte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
7/23/2010 ORDR SANTOS Ex Parte Order for Payment $$192.50 Michael R. Crabtree 
8/6/2010 MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for extension of time to file Michael R. Crabtree 
plaintiffs brief 
8/9/2010 MOTN JANET Amended Ex-Parte motion for extension of time Michael R. Crabtree 
to file plaintiffs brief 
8/10/2010 ORDR JANET Amended Ex-Parte Order re: extension of time to Michael R. Crabtree 
file plaintiffs brief (and extending time for 
respondent's brief) 
MEMO JANET Memorandum in support of petitioner's objection Michael R. Crabtree 
to motion for summary dismissal 
8/11/2010 AFFD JANET Affidavit of Jose Luis Zepeda Michael R. Crabtree 
8/16/2010 MOTN SANTOS Ex Parte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
8/19/2010 ORDR SANTOS Ex parte Order for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
9/8/2010 ORDR JANET Memorandum Decision and Order granting Michael R. Crabtree 
State's Motion for summary dismissal 
9/20/2010 MOTN SANTOS Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
9/22/2010 MOTN JANET Motion for reconsiderations Michael R. Crabtree 
9/24/2010 MEMO JANET Petitioner's memorandum in support of motion for Michael R. Crabtree 
reconsideration 
9/27/2010 ORDR SANTOS Ex Parte Order for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
9/29/2010 MOTN SANTOS Ex Parte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
10/12/2010 ORDR JANET Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Michael R. Crabtree 
Reconsideration 
10/13/2010 ORDR SANTOS ExParte Order for payment $247.50 Michael R. Crabtree 
10/20/2010 APSC JANET Appealed To The Supreme Court - Notice of Michael R. Crabtree 
appeal 
10/21/2010 MOTN JANET ex-parte motion for appointment of state appellate Michael R. Crabtree 
public defender 
10/25/2010 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
ORDR SANTOS ExParte Order for appointment of State Appellate Michael R. Crabtree 
Public Defender 
Date: 11/9/2010 
Time: 09:35 AM 
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Judicial District Court - Minidoka Coll#'""~ t'," 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0000079 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date 
10/29/2010 
11/4/2010 
Code 
ORDR 
MISC 
User 
SANTOS 
SANTOS 
ExParte Order for Payment $137.50 
SC Document Clerk's Record Due Date Set 
User: SANTOS 
Judge 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
l111rnte '\a111e 00512: L 1:0 Z£ 1?u)ll Je.. 
!DOC '\n. :)~ 2.~'l-
,.\ LI d res s ~~e.-f runt~ J" c,.,1 
?o (5011 12.3' M~ HJ ~¾fi) 
Petit inner 
l'\THEDISTRICTCOLRTOFTIIE EI ETH .IL'DICI.\L DISTRICT 
oF T11E STATE oF 10AH0, 1'\ A'\D FOR THE coL'\TY oF M::tNI l)o\\'..Q 
Petitioner. 
IS. 
Respondent. 
The Petitioner nllcgcs: 
C-. ,. C\ 1 --;,.·,\c· ~ ase ... o. V -~ - I ( 
PETITION AND :\FFIDA \'IT 
FOR POST CON\'ICTION 
REUEF 
I. Pl,ice of detention if in rnstndy: QIN~liE.C ~ .JC..:,\ 
'L, 
., 
;--.;,llllC and locltion ol'thc Court 11hid1 imposcdjudgement1scntence: EI_ t: rH 
J. The case number ,ind the nfTensc or offenses for II hicl1 sentence 1\,lS imposed: 
(a) Case '-iu111her: LR -2.co9 -2,l&Y 
1h) CXknse Co111 icted: _t~.0SSt5S•oQ c\ 5\a\m \>roQQ.r_t,_,1--
4. The date upon II hie Ii sentence II as in1pns,:d ,111d the terms 01· sentence: 
,l. D,lle n r Scntrnce: ____.lu.D.,___-__,()o<...>..5,____-_,,'.2..oo=.,,c=-i------------
h. Terms of Senrence: 3 t 5 £oR. 'b '::lK 
Pl:TITIO'.\ ,~c)R r)OST CO'\\'ICTIO'\ REI IEF - I 
J. Check\\ hether a finding of guilty I\ ,is made ,liter a ple,1: 
[;t] Ol'guilty [ ] Ot'not guilty 
6. Did )Oll ,1ppeal 1'1·0111 the,illllg111e11t ot'cofl\iction or the imposition 01·se11te11ee'? 
r YI Yes [ J \ o 
lfso. \\h,it \\,lS the Docket \'u111hcrofthe ,\ppe:11·)--3J_fil3~------
7 St,lte concisely ,111 the grounds 011 \\ hich you base your :1ppl1c11ion for posl 
coll\ ietion relic!': (Lse additional sheets if11ecessc1ry.) 
( ,l) Tu ER.E F X, 5 f:s E,Vi d we.~~ c...Lfetc t5 nm. 
'PrQv.'ous/y PriS2..ohd. TD WiT a IE.±tt 
(b) TffE InE[f/cJ\·v.,e,nR.~ss of t~u1_s._e.~I. ______ _ 
(C) ____ . ____________________________ _ 
S. Prior 10 this petition. h,ne you tiled\\ ith respect to this COil\ iction: 
,l. Petitions in Slate or federal Court for h:1heas corpus?~_-!\,_..._J-[i~·----
b. .\ny other petitions. 111otio11s. or ,1pplications in any other courr> 'fES 
c. lfyou a!lS\\Cl'l.:d yes to :1 or h ahmL\ state the 11a111e ,111d court in \\hicl1 each 
petition. motion or applic:1tio11 \\ as tiled: 
T ~ ~ h: d Aa B\?PEQ\ tD mi:= SuprunE 
L(')uRt 
l1 ETITIO\ f()R POST CO\\'ICTIO\ RELIEF - ~ 
2 
9. If your application is based upon the foilurc ofcounscl to adcqu:1tcly represent you. 
st:1tc concisely m!il in derail,, /mt counsel foiled lo do in representing your interests: 
(a) __________________________ _ 
(b) ___________________________ _ 
(c) __________________________ _ 
I 0. Arc you seeking le~n e to proceed in forrna paup(:'ris. that is. requesting the 
proceeding be ~1t county expense? (If your :ms,, er is ··yes". you must Ii II out ~1 
'vfotion to Proceed in Forllla Pauperis and supporting allid~nit.) 
[X) Yes [ ] :'io 
11. Arc you requesting the appointlllcnt of counsel to represent you in this case·? ( If your 
answer is "yes". you lllllst till out a \1otion lor t/1c Appointlllcnt of Counsel and supporting 
ai'tid,nit. as ,,ell as a !'vlotion to Proceed In Forma Paupcris and supporting affid~nit.) 
[~ Yes [ ] 0io 
I.?. Stale speci tic ally the relit.>!' you seek: 
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3 
cl, 
. (A) . T. f\S\\tsd ttlt. A-l-\ot<X\t'{ to ~E,-} A\-\ald 
of 13R,o.n Co.C<d ~Q.Cau.56 \-\~ \kbu,\J. ~ea Rb\~ ·\o 
: ~\t \p in m,, o~.f1.ns.t I 'ou..t ti1E 0-\-\nRr\~'-\ c\ \d na-\-
MAKc Af\~ '1½~-\11\)'lS At 3teW,<\5 ~\\~\<.\ '-''\ \--V. tv\• 
(~) I. r\GK~d \tfY\ -\o ~t.-\- Pr \;( <jQ_.\Q.C\oR dont: 
0() ~Y\E \\(: 5cx.d ro, I Aq~u\ \\~""' to to..~t. T(\'1 
C.asc -\o i-R',a..L \.\~ to\d \V\~ ~\..\[ft -\a \c&~. ~ \>\1cf\ 
\~x.1£:_:Y•f'l 
(C.) I. r\f;,\(~ -t'nrc; Moffit~ 10 'K~.r<\O\J1c \-\\ 'fY1 s~\t 
C\.S LCU.OSt. \ I \\'c 'Nou.\A nt ~ ~ "t . -r_ F\,S\(~d \o 
W, t\-\6(2S\W Y'f\'i '\)\~A -\jQ_(Q.USc 'I. &t~ \\ wc'--n\-.o..d ·\-o 
.:7~ to +-R~c_\. \-\\::; sCk.d -\ho..\- -i ~'J r-ot we..,+ 
"fu \- I ~ou(\d O\.~ fua.:.t -r:. , C " 'K 33 ( c_) S~\E5 
tha.,+ :t. U)u.\c\ \-\C\VE; W,\\-\d.r<Awn ·ff\,\ "v\tSf\ ~l;:.fort:: 
S .QJl te.rte_ W c\ s '.L rn {x) s t2_(j. 
4 
Trust Fund Resident Activity 
2/3/2010 04:05 PM 
Resident Id Personal Id Last Name 
12208 10498 lZEPEDA 
Beginning Balance 
G 
Task No. Date 
G 7074 I 0/30/2009 17:03:04 
G 7075 J0/30/2009 17:03:04 
G 7076 I 0/30/2009 17:54:57 
G 7079 10/30/2009 18:08:09 
G 7080 l 0/30/2009 18:09: l 1 
G 7310 I I /20/2009 I 5:34:03 
G 7314 l I /20/2009 l 8 :22 :5 I 
G 7351 J 1/23/2009 03:03:15 
G 7384 l I /25/2009 1 l :02:47 
G 7446 12/2/2009 15:39:16 
G 7470 12/6/2009 I 6:26:20 
G 7483 12/7/2009 04: 12:37 
G 7510 12/8/2009 21 :56: 16 
G 7518 12/10/2009 00:05:40 
G 7796 1/6/20 IO 15:09:49 
G 7800 1/6/2010 17:44:21 
G 7815 1/8/20 IO 17:07:44 
Ending Balance 
G 
Owyhee County Sheriffs Office 
Resident Id: 12208 
From: 10/30/2009 
To: 2/3/2010 
Trust Fund Resident Activity 
First Name Class Unit Building Pod 
UOSE GP OwyheeC. .. Main 
Task Check No. Comment 
Intake 
ROA Checks 
ROA Reversed Task No. 7075 
Release Disbursement - R ... 
Intake 
ROA Money Order 
Automated Payment Phone Sales 
Sale 
Automated Payment Phone Sales 
Automated Payment Phone Sales 
ROA Cash Money Only 
Sale 
!Automated Payment Phone Sales 
!Automated Payment Phone Sales 
ROA Money Order 
!Automated Payment Phone Sales 
~utomated Payment Phone Sales 
Trust Fund Resident Activit,, 
1 Of 1 
Bed 
$0.00 
Amount 
$0.00 
$44.00 
($44.00) 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$20.00 
($5.00) 
($3.86) 
($5.00) 
($6.00) 
$10.00 
($1.44) 
($4.00) 
($4.70) 
$10.00 
($5.00) 
($5.00) 
$0.00 
5 
I J. Thi.~ retition 111,1y he acco111pa11ied by ,1nida\ its in support ol'the petition. ( Forms 
r't)r this are ,1, ailahlc.l 
ST/\ TE OF IDAIIO 
) ss 
C () LI 11 I\. () I' M:J:.CkC:cl.ll ) 
. 2 () _lQ__' 
·. )C~ lu.i.S ZcpfDA J(2__. hei11g S\\ om. deposes ,111d says tlwt the party is the 
Petitio11er in the ahm e-entitlcd ,1ppeal and th,11 all st,lle111e111s in this PETITIO\i FOR POST 
CO\iVICTIO\i RELIEF are true :111d correct to the best of his or her knmdedge and belief. 
(SEAL) 
SLf3SCRIBED ;\\;D S\VOR'\J and AFFIR\IED to hefore me 1'1,s {~ d,1y oi' 
,-............ _____ _ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
IleYerly L. White 
STATE OF IDAHO 
\otarv I lie rix ld:1ho 
Co111,;1issio11 t:\pires: '}_ - 4 -1 QJS-, 
P!:TIT/()\.; H)R rosT CO'\\ K'TIO\ Rf:/_/ [T - -+ 
6 
CF:RTIFIC.-\TF: OF \I.-\ILl:\G 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that Oil the t "j( day ot' FEbucu21, . :!O_J1.l. f mailed a 
copy of this PETITION FOR POST CO\iVICTfO'.\ RELIEF for the purposes nt' tiling ,,ith the 
court and ot'111ailing a true and correct copy, ia prison mail system to the LS. mail system to: 
f'Yll(\J:IDo(A County Prnsecuti11g Attorney 
LAnc t 5U:\JE:0&}() ?6 t3ox 3bo 
'Rupr-,f2.f ~ 0 -033 5D 
PETITfO'\ FOR POST CO\;VICTIO'.\ RELi EF - 5 
7 
Ar-TIOAVIT OF FACTS I\: SL PPORT OF POST-CO'\VICTIO\' PETITI00i 
ST.-\ TE Of=" ID:\ 110 
) ss 
cm \'TY OF Mtbtr.DoKA 
1ll£rr: \SXi,.)t~ E\1 ;de..n~~\ tc~\s r,,y\-- 1?n .. 1,.1;ou&\.' ~'f!.'i~n1«!. 
A \Et\« :\he..\ \JJou..ld h£we 'no~oJ \(\ m'\ de\o ~ \¼A ¼-1c> M\Dtn'-"\ 31\\\%\::\gc.~ed 
\ ·.li<c: ·1 A&\O.J \J.~rn .. ·::r f\\~ c'rk.\-q ik-\: :1 k>tl:vJl :\\r\£. ~\,\c,Q..~~fil~ve_ 
ffiJ:CMnSt,\ m :fut £c,.t:\: ""c.,} :r f\~~ l ~ -\o ~ o E\ (u,J ~'ill~S ~\.l.cJ1 BS <zje \\; nJ 
~\\ei\J_~-1)(:ic..oCc.Jd~.\A;,,j A\;1. t\e-hc!oo !cru.. -'"oi...!MA- \\.,- :Sc.·,4 fit\ fu()tb 
Wtiu\~ hc.vt V\R"'R~ M:) lb.R.~5~ :I Ptf:!lt.~ \\·\vn .\o \J.,.,1-.>th~,e,.w Y'V\b V\,t<; 
i)_e_c~ -:1. li,,\C..frk.A_Jo 30 ±9 t< ~ c,_\ \.\£ ?)O..,~~ ~ 1.t,Jf\;. {\C\'.l: C>-\\<lW f ~ ~ 
W~\:hdrkW__~~C. Q ll_Cc_) C \oc,.Q.\4i ~-\:c,\-Q.s \m:\-- ·:::r C .ou\o :I.~fuT 
hc.ve_ u,1:J:hdcc-.v..n m~(t.o. fltfo·a. _fuo Stnhi\<t. v,ie:'.> ::«i-W\ \J()xd Sn '1:t 
Ut<!.JZ.\) 5Y1t,wS fucd: ::tk AA\-o{L~\i.JCS ::r.n1..,ITtdiv~ A':i Counf;-t\, b'<:: 
f\\So tC...:\e.d b Co,v'\du{.:t aJtcv1c.lt P~O.Jc_\. '"I:Qv2Si~jaJioo, \h ~c-',\!l__ 
h Qe.va.lop AAvLJ'.sQa;c;. \ ~a r:a\.A,os M-\\\v.&t. \.\E (\\~ ~c..:.\.e.~ \o 
t\t\Q ~t k ctQ,\J2 \c,p ~c;c;:,, \\\)_ll 1..c.\?petl w\fu c'w,nr-, Aoc! ,a..i\no::e _i_ 
's::n±!caoJ ~\eG (\~ (1u;\\j tv..\-:: Cir,n~~:\:;on(J 5u<:..k'L o.. £uc-. w,-\-\.-. A 
fil_c..h~eot to \b.t 1.:.,££0 c+ the .. :\- :r. J;c! f\t\k r\<1""';\: fu £c.c..\S ~t 1"1t: 
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f\5_\J.__-r_Y\t_;:, (.~u.(lT -\a C--5\ QJ~'(Yt 1(.Q \", tf If\ ~~ 
1\\ (\n'( 'il\lA I 
rurthcr vour ai'lia11t savcth not. 
. . 
SL BSCRIBED A'\D SWOR.\ .-\'.\D AFFIR\,IED TO before me this /~l,1y ot' 
. 20 _/J) 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
BeYcr!y L. White 
STATE OF IDA.HO 
My Commission E.,pircs: 2-4-206 
. 
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3o& l 1-1.,:1 :Zepe:Ol\ 0 1<, 
F,ill N;ime of P::irty Filing This Document 
O\u'-JH~ (c.!.ltl~c..;\ ·vo (3oJ(. \ '2.$ 
Mai11n,, A,cir.ress ( Street er Po~t Cff,ce Box) 
lY\URPtt~ ·--rD 153'=,SG 
C,ty St.ite ilnd Z1~ Cede 
Telephone ~J,Pnber 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE E I.F It± JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF l"\It-JI...(»)(.~ 
Case No.: <::__v <2.-{)\0-7°\ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
Plaintiff, 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
VS. 
Defendant. 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of M,'IJJ'I.Do~~ 
) 
) SS, 
) 
[ ] Plaintiff b<'l Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees. and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) Pa$T C,(')(\\Jit\-\c,() \...<t\~.e~ 
believe I'm entitled to get what I am asking for. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 212512005 
. I 
PAGE 1 
11 
2. [ J I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [ J I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
f." -" 
'~-·. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages 
if more space is needed for any response. 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: ::5D~)t w:") :ZEPeOA: -;;e Other name(s) I have used: ________ _ 
Address: C\A,"-1\:\:ff:: C: ounb :3'---\ :Vo \)0}(... \ 7-i Mq R..Pt\~\ ::I.D ~36SQ 
---"'--'-"......_,I.Lb ________ Phone:_"-/!:{=-------
Date and place of birth 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am [><J single [ J married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: ~./4. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-1 OC 2i25!2005 
PAGE 2 
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My other dependents (including minor children} ar
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: ~s_,,kz ____ per [ ] week [ ] month 
Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: 
--------------
l'vly spouse's income:$ IY I a per [ ] week [ ] month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City 
\.) 
State 
tJ(A 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description 1pro•1ide description for each rtrn1) 
Cash 
Notes and Receivables 
Vehicles: 
Bank1Credit Union/Savin 
Stocks:Bonds/lnvestments/Certificates of De osit 
Trust Funds 
Retirement Accounts/I RAs/401 (k )s 
Cash Value Insurance 
Motorc cles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles: 
Furniture/Appliances 
Jewelry/Antiques,·Collectibles 
r11OTION Al',JO AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSlmJ TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-100 2/2512005 
Value Equity 
Value 
PAGE 3 
13 
Description (provide description for ec1ch item) 
TVs/Stereos/Com uters/Electronics 
Tools/Equipment 
Sporting Goods/Guns 
Horses/Livestock/Tack 
Other (describe) 
EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses. 
Expense 
Rent/House Payment µJ,1 
Vehicle Payment(s) 
Credit Cards: /list each account number) 
/VIA 
Loans: (name of lender and reason for loan) 
NIA 
NIA 
AJ/lt 
MA 
N/& 
Electricity/Natural Gas 
Water/Sewer/Trash ;vfB 
Phone .v{A 
Groceries NlB 
Clothing NIA 
Auto Fuel rJi.A 
Auto Maintenance NIA 
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons JV/A 
Entertainment/Books/Magazines NIA 
Home Insurance JV/A 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-1 OC 2/25/2005 
Value 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
PAGE 4 
14 
Expense 
Auto Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Merlir:al Insurance 
Medical Expense 
Other Cb; \d :Supp,12.T 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
Iv/A 
N/A 
JJ/A 
Iv/A 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
How much can you borrow? $ ___ (Z5 _____ From whom? --~"0--+-f_A-_____ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? .... 2...,eo=G:i=--- Amount of refund: $_a,: ____ _ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided) 
Name Address Phone Years Known 
Signature 
Typed or Printed Name 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of _______ _ 
20 
MOTION AND AFFIDA\;IT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-1 DC 2125:2005 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at __________ _ 
My Commission expires ______ _ 
PAGE 5 
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PL·titio11er 
I\: THE DISTRICT COL RT OF THE E lEI\:\- JL:DlClA.L DISTRICT 
OF THE ST:\ TE OF l D:\I 10. I\ 1\'\D HlR Tl IE COLi\TY OF {'J\1.\\l·1.£:)o'h~ 
Petitio11er. 
\ s. 
RL'spo11de11t. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
C1sc l',o. Cv <2.0 \0-7 q 
:\IOTIO'\' A'\' D .-\FFI DAVIT IN 
SUPPORT FOR 
.-\PPOINTi\lENT OF 
COUNSEL 
. Petitioner in the above 
e11titlcd 111,1tter ,111d n10\es this f-10110r,1hlc Court to gr,mt Petitionei-'s \lotion It)(· A11poi11t111ent of 
Coun.-;el l<.H the re,1sons more fully set !t)rth herein ,ind in the.-\ llid:l\ it i11 Support of !\:lotion lt)r 
.\11point111ent of Cou11sel. 
I. Petitioner is currently i11c.m:er,1tcd \, ii hin the ltlal10 Dep:1r1111ent or Corrections 
under the direct c,1re. custody and control of \V,mlcn S\t;;IJG ~\\=.'<\tY1dF 2:: 
or the ('\W"i.liEC C OLtnbt 3u., \ 
The issues to he prescnlL·d in this case 111,1_\ heco111c to con1plc, for the Petitionn 
to 11rnperl: 11ur~ue. Petitio11er l:1cb the k110\\ ledge and skill nccdul to represent hi111 herself. 
.3. Petitioner Respondent required ~1ssisll1ncc co111plcti11g tl1csc plc~1dings. as he sl1c 
1\as unable to do it hi111 hL·rsclf. 
\10TIO'\ ,\'.',[) .\FFID1\ \'IT I\' SL rr10RT FOR .\PPOI\T\IE\T OF COL"\SEL - I 
-+. Other: 
----------------------------~ 
. 2n Ii.::, . 
,\FFIO:\ \Tr I:\ SUPPORT FOR .\PPOIYDIE:\T OF COU.'\SEL 
ST.\TE OF I DA 110 
) ss 
County of M1nt.do~L- J 
·;:r!lSt:;: I ui) 7~. ;1J'ter first being duly s,,orn upon his her oath. deposes 
and savs as follllws: 
I. I ;1111 tile A fti;111t in the a/JO\ e-e11titled case: 
under the care. rnstody and control ot· Warde11_5_tlovE t:"\~'{\~6E:2: 
J. I ;1m indigent ,111d do not h:1,e :111y t'unds to hire pri,ate counsel: 
-+. I ,llll ,, itl1011t h:mk accou11ts. stod:s. ho11ds. re;il est;1le nr ,111y other lt)rlll 01· real 
propcrtj: 
5. I a111 u11;1hlc to p1·0, ide ;111y lllhc,· ltm11 of secu,·ity: 
(1 I ;1111 untrained in tile l:1,,: 
7 It· I am ltffced to 11rnceed ,, ithout counsel heing :1ppoi11led I ,, ill he unl'air/y 
llamlicappcd in co111peli11g ,, ith tr,1irn:tl :111d cnmpete111 counsel nt'the Stale: 
Fu rt her _\our ,l 1·1i,111 t s:1yet h 11:1 ugh t. 
\IOT/0\ \.\D AFFID,-\ \"IT I\ SL PPORT FOR APPOI\T\1E'\T OF COL '\SEL - 2 
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WHEREFORE. f>ctitioncr respectfully prays that this llonor:1ble Court issue 
i1·s Ordc1· granting Petit,onu·s \lotion 1·or .-\ppoin1n1c11t 01· Counsel to represent his her inte1·est. 
or in the ,i11ern:1ti\ c grant any such relict' to which it 111ay ap11c1r tl1e f>etitinner is entitled to. 
D.-\ TED This _J_ da\ 01· fE bJL~u_c_~fl-~-,.._ ____ . 20 IO. 
SUBSCRIBED At\/0 SWOR:-.. A\O AFFIR\ffD to before 111e this L!};_l:1y 
.20~. 
rSEAL) 
~.tJ_</(_J to 
~ic !'or ld:1ho 
Co1111;1issio11 c,pires: J - L/-l0/5" 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ne,·erly L. 'i\'hite 
STATE OF ID . .\.HO 
\lOTIO\ .. \\[) .\FFID.-\ \'IT 1, SL rrrnn FOR .-\Pf>OI\ T\IL\;T or COL '\SFL - J 
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CERTIFICATE OF :\L-\lU'.\G 
HEREBY CERTIFY tlwt 011 the 
mailed :1 copy ot· this \IOTIO\ X\D :\FFID,·\ \'IT I\ SL Pf)ORT FOR :\PPOl'H\IE\!T OF 
('()l \Sf~L lr)1· tile pur1)()Se~ 01·11li11!,'. \\illi tile court a11d ofrnailing a true :rnd co,-rc.:ct copy \ia 
pris()Jl mail systcrn for processing to tile L.S. rnai I systc111 to: 
lQsoc t; S hz )-/La~ o \?o 5~~ 
~ QEil :I \J ?,{!,Yd:) 
\IOTIO\ ,·\\D \f~FID\ \'IT l'.\i SL.PPORT FOR -\PPOI.\T\IE\T OF COL.\SEL - -i 
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11111,"te 11~1111e 30Sf. w.:..:> Zt:A oa ;y-~ 
!DOC ,o. 3f.c.'L't> r 
.\rldress OW:thtf C~ Jo.,·.1 
Pc, f>(;>i. n .. ~ ~e»t11\ -:xJ) 15~0 
1, THE DISTRICT COL RT OF Tiff f I.F Tl-\ JLDICL~L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 1, A,D FOR TH[ COL:\TY OF lY\-r.N::tOO~ 
Petitioner. 
\ s. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
ORnER GR.\NTll\G 
:\IOTION FOR 
APPOIYDIE.'\T 
OF COL''.\SEL 
IT IS H EA RBY ORDERED th:1t the Petitioner's \lotion for Appoi11t111e11t ot' 
(allorney·s 11a111e). a duly 
licensed nllorney in the State of ld:1'10. is hereby appointed to reprL·sent s:1id deknd:111t in 
all proceedings involving the post conviction petition. 
DATED this /9 ~v of 
District forlgc 
ORDER GRA:\Tl'.;G \IOTIO\: TO Af)POl\:T COL'.\SEL 
20 
ORIGINAL 
MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
STATE OF IDAHO 
LANCED. STEVENSON, Prosecuting Attorney {ISB#7733J 
MICHAEL P. TRIBE, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney {ISB#6816) 
ALAN GOODMAN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney {ISB#2778) 
ROBERTS. HEMSLEY, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney /ISB#7955) 
715 G. Street, P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Office: (208)436-7187 
Facsimile: (208) 436-3177 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF IDAHO 
f;,_ · .. 
C,'.,:;'i: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
DISTRICT COURT 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2010-0079 
) 
) 
) 
) ANSWER TO PETITION 
) FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, the State ofldaho, by and through Michael P. Tribe, Minidoka 
County Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner's ("Jose Luis Zepeda 
Jr.") petition for post-conviction relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA'S POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Jose Luis Zepeda are denied by Respondent unless specifically 
ANSWER-I 
admitted herein. 
II. 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA'S POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
I. Answering paragraphs one (1), two (2), three (3) and (4) of page one (I) of the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein. 
2. Answering paragraphs five (5) and six (6) of page two (2) of the Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein. 
3 Answering paragraph seven (7), of page two (2) Respondent denies the allegations 
contained therein. 
a) Respondent denies that evidence of material facts exist that was not previously 
presented. 
b) Respondent denies the claims ofineffecti ve assistance of counsel. 
4. Answering paragraph eight (8), Respondent admits the contents contained therein. 
5. Answering paragraph nine (9), Respondent denies the contents contained therein 
including subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) attached to the Petition. 
6. Answering paragraphs ten (I 0), and eleven (11) and twelve (12), Respondent 
admits the allegations. 
7. Answering paragraphs twelve (12) and thirteen (13), Respondent denies the 
allegations. 
ANSWER-2 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Jose Luis Zepeda's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be 
granted. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (a); I.R.C.P. 12(b )(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Jose Luis Zepeda's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, 
the claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-4901(b). 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Jose Luis Zepeda's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and 
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible 
evidence, and therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code § § 19-
4902( a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
c) For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary. 
DATED this 3rd day of March 2010. 
, Michael P :irib 
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney 
ANSWER-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3 ,.,.,_.,. day of March 2010, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr. 
IDOC #36287 
Owyhee County Jail 
PO BOX 128 Murphy, ID 83650 
ANSWER-4 
~4fZt 
Michael P. Tribe 
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney 
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COURT MINUTES 
CV-2010-0000079 
Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/19/2010 
Time: 9:50 am 
Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-I 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland 
Party: Jose Zepeda, Attorney: Greg Fuller 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson 
Petitioner is not present, is in custody of State 
Court calls case, notes here on counsel's requested status 
('.f\2·= . 
,_,1, lv'- ,, ______ ---- -----··--
Mr. Fuller addresses Court, petition may be premature, cites considerations, particular case 
(criminal) is on direct appeal continues, reviews issues in petition, cites to State V Jackson 
continues, asks Court to set another status in this matter in 60-90 days to allow contact with 
appeal counsel and make decisions about issues, also try to get a hold ofletter that was 
supposedly attached to petition continues comments. 
Mr. Stevenson responds - will be doing a motion for summary judgment which feel entitled 
to do, notes does have an affidavit of facts and maybe that is the letter referring to, no 
objection. 
Court comments, state is free to proceed as in any civil case, notes issues on appeal need to 
be clarified, if counsel wish to have status Court is happy to have one, 
Mr. Fuller responds -
Court responds regarding basis for hearing, haven't scheduled for evidentiary hearing, will 
rely on State to proceed at this point, comments further, will not schedule for a hearing at 
this point in absence of motions - Case in recess @ 10:00 a.m. 
25 
ORIGtNAL 
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
MINIDOKA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
LANCED. STEVENSON, Prosecuting Attorney (ISB#7733) 
ALAN GOODMAN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (ISB#2778) 
ROBERTS. HEMSLEY, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (ISB#7955) 
MICHAEL P. TRIBE, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (ISB#68 l 6) 
715 G. Street, P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Office: (208)436-7187 
Facsimile: (208) 436-3177 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA JR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
"2.0\0-79 
) CASE NO. CV-2008-89~ 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) DISMISSAL AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NO\V State ofldaho, Respondent, by and through Michael P. Tribe, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Minidoka County, and hereby moves the Court for 
Summary Dismissal dismissing the Petitioner's, Jose Luis Zepeda Jr., Post Conviction 
Relief Petition pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) and submits the following brief in 
support of motion for summary dismissal. 
Motion and Brief in Support 
, \'1: c I \,I i V 
<·, 
: -J -"~i L; t f 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 27, 2009, petitioner pled guilty to grand theft by receiving/possessing 
stolen property in violation of Idaho Code § 18-2403(4). The District Court imposed a 
unified eight-year sentence, with a three-year determinate term and a subsequent 
indeterminate term of five-years. Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court on 
October 26, 2009, which is currently pending. 
Petitioner filed the current Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief on 
February 11, 2010. The petition alleged two grounds for post conviction relief. The first 
is the alleged existence "of evidence of material facts not previously presented. To wit a 
letter." The second ground is a claim of "ineffectiveness of counsel." 
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL ST AND ARDS 
A. General Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding, which is civil in 
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 
92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App.1992). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a 
complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application must contain much more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 
1995). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to 
facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other 
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why 
such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. Like a 
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plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; 
Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each 
essential element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those 
factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,651 (Ct. App. 1982); Stone v. 
State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may 
take judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 
Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 1987), affd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 
(1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 
(1992). 
B. Legal Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Under Idaho Code§ 19-
4906(c) 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC. § 19-
4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56. State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). LC. § 19-4906(c) 
provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
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Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle 
the applicant to the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is presented, 
an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 
(Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied 
(2003); LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 P.3d at 1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647, 873 
P.2d at 901). Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) (Follinus's 
claim that his attorney had been ineffective in failing to obtain a Franks hearing to 
contest the veracity of statements by the search warrant affiant was properly summarily 
dismissed where the court found that trial counsel did obtain, in effect, a Franks hearing 
at the suppression hearing); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d 860, 864 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (record of extradition proceedings disproved applicant's claim that he was 
denied right to counsel in those proceedings). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of 
relief when they do not justify relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 
869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 
1190 (1975); Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443, 446-47 901 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 906, 894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(police affidavit was sufficient to support issuance of search warrant, and defense 
Motion and Brief in Support 4 29 
attorney therefore was not deficient in failing to move to suppress evidence on the ground 
that warrant was illegally issued). 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to 
entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 
Idaho at 826, 702 P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an 
essential element on which he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is 
appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Although the Strickland v. Washington standard has typically been applied to ineffective 
assistance of counsel occurring at trial or sentencing, its standard is equally applicable to 
ineffective assistance claims arising out of the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58 (1985). 
III. Petitioner's Claims Fail To Raise A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact And Do Not 
Entitle Him To Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
A. Legal Standards Applicable To Petitioner's Burden Of Making Out A Prima Facie 
Case of Evidence Not Previously Presented Or Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Petitioner in his Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post Conviction Petition alleges 
that "[t]here exists evidence of material facts not previously presented. Specifically, "[a] 
letter that would have helped in my defense had the attorney investigated like I asked 
him." Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post Conviction Petition, p. 1. The petitioner does 
not allege what was contained in the letter nor does he establish that the "evidence of 
material facts" would have had any impact of the outcome of his case. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides relief from a conviction 
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where there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard, and that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. Idaho Code § 
19-4901(a)(4). The request for a new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on 
newly discovered evidence is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury 
verdict. The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial is set forth 
in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,551 P.2d 972 (1976). The Drapeau court quoted from 
a treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the test for determining 
whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
Although defendants are tireless in seeking new trials on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, motions on this 
ground are not favored by the courts and are viewed with 
great caution. No court wishes a defendant to remain in jail 
if he has discovered evidence showing that he is not guilty, 
but after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly 
tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial. 
Accordingly rather exacting standards have been developed 
by the courts for motions of this kind. A motion based on 
newly discovered evidence must disclose (I) that the 
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) that the evidence is 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it 
will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to 
learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the 
part of the defendant.' 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminals 557, at 515 (1969) (emphasis added). 
This analysis by Professor Wright is consistent with the 
approach taken by this Court in the past to motions for new 
trials tendered by defendants in criminal proceedings on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence. 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972,978 (1976). The grounds upon which 
a new trial may be granted are set out in LC. § 19-2406. 
When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the 
court may, upon his application, grant a new trial in the 
following cases only: 
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7. When new evidence is discovered material to the 
defendant, and which he could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial. When a 
motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly-
discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the 
hearing in support thereof the affidavits of the witnesses by 
whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if time is 
required by the defendant to procure such affidavits the 
court may postpone the hearing of the motion for such 
length of time as, under all the circumstances of the case, 
may seem reasonable. 
B. Discussion Regarding Petitioner's Claim Of Evidence Not Previously Presented or 
Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Based on the current pleadings by the petitioner in this case and the above-cited legal 
authority, there is no showing of newly discovered evidence. Rather there is a claim of a 
letter that wasn't presented by the petitioner's attorney and such a claim is more properly 
assigned as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no demonstration that 
the letter or that the evidence is material. Even if the letter should have been investigated 
or presented by petitioner's attorney, there is no allegation in the petition or the 
accompanying affidavit that the contents of the letter would have affected the outcome of 
the petitioner's case or that it will likely have produced an acquittal, especially in light of 
the fact that he entered a guilty plea. There is also no allegation that there was a failure 
to learn of the evidence due to no lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner or his 
attorney. Petitioner merely contends that his attorney failed to investigate the contents of 
the letter and such claim goes to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Therefore, petitioner's claim based on newly discovered should be denied and 
summary dismissal is appropriate on this claim. 
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C. Legal Standards Applicable To Petitioner's Burden Of Making Out A Prima Facie 
Case Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must 
demonstrate both that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 
1997). "Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances 
of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance 
was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial 
strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 
117 4, 117 6 ( 198 8). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 
1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
Thus, the first element - deficient performance - "requires a showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. 
The second element - prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient 
performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's deficient 
performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been 
Motion and Brief in Support 8 33 
/.-.' 
'di 
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 
241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, petitioner has the burden of 
showing that his trial counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 
(1992). 
As explained in Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992), "The 
constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison 
for a defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have 
been tried better." 
D. Discussion Regarding Petitioner's Claim Oflneffective Assistance Of Counsel 
In his Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post Conviction, the petitioner has 
made the following claims against his attorney: 1) not getting a hold of Brian Card; 2) not 
setting up a lie detector test; 3) asking his attorney to withdraw his guilty plea which was 
not done; 4) conduct adequate pre-trial investigation; 5) failed to "develop adversarial or 
fighting attitude,"; and, 6) failed to developed "effective rapport with client." 
None of the six (6) above-listed claims meet the Strickland test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. There is no showing of deficient performance such that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. There are no facts presented establishing that the 
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The burden of 
establishing deficient counsel is on that of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner's 
claim fails as to the first element of the ineffective assistance claim. 
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In addition, the second element of the Strickland test, prejudice, which requires a 
showing that counsel's deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on his 
defense, has not been established or even articulated by the petitioner. There is no 
explanation of why Brian Card is important or why the failure of a lie detector test 
prejudiced the petitioner. Claim number four ( 4) is vague and fails to articulate what 
more should have been done by counsel and claims five (5) and six (6) cannot provide 
grounds for relief even if true. 
Claim three (3), failure of counsel to file a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea when requested could provide a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
However, motions to withdraw guilty pleas are seldom granted and the petitioner has not 
made a showing that it would have been successful or what his reason for requesting the 
motion was. Again, the burden is on the petitioner to establish an actual adverse effect on 
his case. At this juncture, it appears that he is simply inviting the District Court to 
second-guess his trial counsel's strategic decision without any facts that such decisions 
were made due to inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 
(2003). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's claims regarding newly discovered evidence are bare and conclusory 
statements unsubstantiated by fact and should be dismissed. In addition, petitioner's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The State, therefore, 
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respectively requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
without hearing or oral argument. 
DATED this 6th day of July 2010. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 day of July 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL to be placed in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Daniel S. Brov.'ll 
P.O. Box L 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
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IN THE DIsTRIcT couRT oF THE FIFTH JuDIcIAL rnsr~IcT Orf b-Gi~P'u 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2010-79 
SCHEDULING ORDER REGARDING 
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
On July 7, 2010, the State filed with the court a Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
The State did not request oral argument. 
The Petitioner's pleadings in opposition to the State's motion are to be filed with 
the court no later than 5:00 p.m., August 6, 2010. The Petitioner must indicate 
whether oral argument on the motion is requested. 
The State's Reply is to be filed with the court no later than 5:00 p.m., August 20, 
201 
O. Dated July / z-:' 2010. ~~ 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
SCHEDULING ORDER REGARDING STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
CV-2010-79 Page 1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \j of rrvJ~J , 2010, I served a true, 
correct copy of the SCHEDULING ORDER REGARDING STATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL upon the following in the manner provided: 
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Daniel S. Brown 
P. 0. BoxL 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0055 
(/") };:MAIL ~ . 
( ,,fHand Deli very - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
(i~M/\IL ~ t<"\~ L 
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 
39 
Greg J. Fuller 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box L 
161 Main A venue West 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Telephone: (208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB #1442 
ISB #7538 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No. C\/-2010-0000079 
OBJECTION 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., by and through his attorneys ofrecord, 
Fuller Law Offices, and hereby objects to Defendant's Motion for Summary Dismissal and 
Brief in Support, and will file a Brief in Support thereof within the next ten (10) days, i.e., on or 
before Friday, July 23, 2010. 
DATED This ~f July, 2010. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the/q/t,day of July, 2010, a true and 
coITect copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
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· Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. BoxL 
161 Main Avenue West 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Telephone: (208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB #l.442 
ISB #7.538 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH n.IDICJAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR.., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
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EX-PARTE MOTION 
FOR EXTENSION QF 
TIME TO FIL.B PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW Plaintiff., Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., by and through his attomeys ofrecord, 
Fuller Law Offices, and hereby moves trus Court for an Ex-Parte Order extending the time 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF' TIME - I 
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within which Plaintiff is to file his Brief in tbis matter from Friday, August 6, 2010, at 5: 00 
o'clock p.m to Monday, August 9, 2010, at 5:00 o'cloc.k p.m 
This Motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein. and upon 
the fact that counsel for Plaintiff have been. in extensive litigation during the past week, i.e., a 
jury trial in Cassia County and several other hearings in the Fifth Judicial District, and, therefore, 
have been unable to finalize said Brief Counsel for Defendant has been contacted and has no 
objection to the requested extension of time. 
~
DATED Th.is£ day of August, 2010. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
CERTIFICATE OF 
T, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the /Jf::aay of August, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ex-Parte Motion for E.xtension was mailed, United States Mai], 
postage prepaid, to the fo11owfog: 
Lance Stevenson 
.Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, JD 83350 
{208) 436-3177 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr,, by and through his attorneys ofrecord, 
Fuller Law Offices, and hereby moves this Court for an Ex-Pa.tie Order extending the time 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
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MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
FOR SlTMMARY DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., by and through his attorneys of 
record, Fuller Law Offices, and hereby requests that the Comt deny Respondent's Motion for 
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Summary Dismissal for the following reasons: 
First of all, Petitioner would stipulate to the apparent accuracy of the State's statement 
regarding the factual and procedural history of this matter. And, Petitioner would further 
stipulate to the accuracy and probable relevance of the applicable legal standards set out by the 
State in its Brief, adding with pa1ticularity the following legal standards: 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906( c) authorizes summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief Sununary dismissal of an application 
pursuant to J.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 
1067 (Ct. App. 2003). J.C. § 19-4906( c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits 
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised 
no genuine issue of material fact, which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, 
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief [ emphasis added.] If such a 
genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. [emphasis added.] Gonzalez v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 
P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 
P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to 
dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. 
App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 F.3d at 
1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 90 I). 
Petitioner has alleged that his appointed counsel has violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel by failure to perform various tasks. And, while Petitioner has listed a number of 
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general areas where his counsel has allegedly en-ed, counsel intends to concentrate on two 
specific areas, primarily for the reason that the immediate issue at hand involves the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906( c). Basically, it is 
Petitioner's position that there do exist issues of material facts such that an evidentiary hearing 
must be conducted, pursuant to Gonzalez v. State and other cases listed above. First of all, it 
is important to point out that although there is an appeal to the Supreme Court presently 
pending which was filed on or about October 26, 2009, none of the issues set out in 
Petitioner's post conviction action are issues that were presented to the Appeal Com1. 
Also, there was a plea agreement entered in this case wherein Petitioner agreed to 
plead guilty to the theft and the state dismissed the persistent violator allegation and 
recommended a sentence of eight years with three fixed to run concmTently with the sentences 
in the other two cases. 
The first issue involves Petitioner's claim that there "exists evidence of material facts not 
previously presented," to wit: a letter. In fact, there are two letters which counsel feels are 
significant, copies of which have been filed as a supplement to the original Petition by way of 
Affidavit of Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., filed contemporaneously herewith, copies of which are 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. The cmTespondence from the Mini-
Cassia Public Defender's Office is significant for the reasons that it does indicate that the 
Petitioner in this case did request the Public Defender, in a letter of January 6, 2010, to 
withdraw his plea of guilty prior to being sentenced. 
The c01Tespondence from Brian R. Card is significant and relevant to Petitioner's first 
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issue involving evidence of material facts not previously presented. I believe the letter speaks 
for itself which would suppo1i Petitioner's representations at the time that Petitioner entered a 
plea of guilty. In fact, when it was time to enter the plea, according to the transcript on appeal, 
Petitioner informed the Com1 that he had been released from custody in Ada County and had 
accepted a ride back to his home from two other detainees. When they got to Rupe11, Idaho, 
the person driving asked if he could leave the car at Petitioner's home and Petitioner agreed. 
However, Petitioner did not know that the car was stolen. However, presumably because of 
the plea bargain, he did tell the Comi that he should have known it was stolen. Hearing this 
recitation, the Court held that it could not accept a guilty plea. Petitioner then stated to the 
Comi, "Your Honor, I want to plead guilty to the charge. I should have known that the car 
was stolen. I did not take steps to find out that it wasn't, base on - like I said, all I was trying 
to do was get back to Rupert." In addition, defense counsel explained to the Comt that there 
were two letters in the car written by someone was still in jail telling Mr. Zepeda to take the car 
and give him a piece of the action. Counsel stated, "[T]here's quite a bit o facts that the State 
would have used to prove this case against him." Defense counsel then suggested an Alford 
plea, and the Court accepted that plea finding that there was a factual basis. 
The whole point here is that the above-cited infonnation, that is, that Petitioner had 
notified his counsel that he wanted to withdraw his plea of guilty, that he actually entered an 
A !ford plea to the charge, and that according to Petitioner, he notified his lawyer prior to 
sentencing that he wished to withdraw his plea of guilty, and the letter from his attorney dated 
January 12, 2009, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, 
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indicates an apparent unwillingness to abide by Petitioner's request, all together ce11ainly 
create a "loss of opportunity" by Petitioner to withdraw his plea of guilty and try the case on the 
merits such that he was prejudiced sufficiently to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on the failure to withdraw the plea as was requested. Although there appears to 
be no "smoking gun" here, demonstrating that Petitioner did, in fact, communicate his wish to 
withdraw his plea of guilty prior to sentencing, these allegations certainly raise a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether or not he did in fact communicate this intent to his counsel in a 
timely fashion. Since counsel did not pursue Petitioner's request to withdraw his plea as 
directed by Petitioner, Petitioner suffered prejudice and loss of his opp011unity to defend himself 
against he accusation that he possessed stolen property when, in fact, he never knew the 
prope11y was stolen. 
The issue regarding Petitioner's claim of evidence not previously presented or newly 
discovered evidence involves the letter from Brian R. Card. Respondent claims that 
Petitioner's claim based on newly discovered evidence should be denied for the reasons that 
there is no demonstration that the letter is material, there is no allegation in the Petition that the 
contents of the letter would have affected the outcome of Petitioner's case or that it would likely 
have produced an acquittal (there was no showing of the actual letter but only a claim that the 
letter existed.) Based upon all of this, Respondent claims that Summary Dismissal is 
appropriate on this claim. 
However, said letter has now been presented and filed as an Affidavit supplementing 
Petitioner's previously filed papers, and said letter obviously speaks for itself, i.e., the letter, at 
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the very least, presents an issue as to whether or not Petitioner actually knew that the prope1iy 
he was accused of being in possession of was stolen. Although the letter itself is obviously not 
conclusive as to whether Petitioner actually knew the prope1iy was or was not stolen, it at least 
raises a "genuine issue of material fact" as to whether one of the elements necessary for 
conviction actually existed, especially considering the fact that the Petitioner entered an Alford 
plea. Petitioner always maintained that he didn't actually know that the prope1iy was stolen, 
but only suggested that he "should have known" the prope1iy was stolen. For this reason alone, 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal on this claim should be denied. 
The following cited authority adequately suppo1is Petitioner's position that Summary 
Dismissal is not appropriate in this case: 
Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272 (1990), 787 P.2d 258, states as follows: 
Turning to Paii-ott's argument that the district comi ened in dismissing his 
petition without an evidentiai-y hearing, we first note the standard ofreview. A 
trial comi may grant a motion by either paiiy for summai-y disposition of an 
application for post conviction relief where it appeai-s from the pleadings that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. I. C. § 19-4906( c ). However, where 
issues of material fact exist, an evidentiary hearing must be held. I. C. § 19-
4907; Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct.App. 
1985); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P .2d 546 (Ct.Appl. 1982). 
On appeal, this Comi must decide whether the State's summary disposition 
motion was properly granted. This requires that we view the facts in a light 
most favorable to the petitioner, and detemrine whether theyw ould entitle him 
to relief if accepted as true. Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 7 4 7 P .2d 94 
(Ct.App. 1987); Wolfe v. State, 114 Idaho 659, 759 P.2d 950 (Ct.App. 
1988) (petition for review denied, December 8, 1988). While this requires that 
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations be accepted as true, we ai-e not required 
to accept the petitioner's conclusions. Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 603 
P.2d 1005 (1979). 
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stated: 
The Comi in State v. Jacskon, 96 Idaho 584 (1975), 532 P.2d 926, states: 
It is the conclusion of this comi that when the defendant entered a plea of guilty 
but conditioned such plea with a statement to the effect that he did not admit the 
facts of the charge, and prior to sentencing the defendant then moved to 
withdraw the plea of guilty, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial comi not to 
grant such a motion. Thus, the judgment on which the plea of guilty was 
entered must be set aside, and the cause remanded with directions for the trial 
comi to allow the defendant to change his plea to not guilty and set the case for 
trial. 
In State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957 (App. 1990), 801 P.2d 1308, the Comi stated: 
An Alford plea was accepted by our Supreme Court as a just reason for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea. State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 
(1975). The Comi in Jackson, supra, stated: "when the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty but conditioned such plea with a statement tot he effect that he did 
not admit the facts of the charge, and prior to sentencing the defendant then 
moved to withdraw the plea of guilty, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial 
comi not to grant such a motion." 
The Comi in Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (App. 1993), 865 P.2d 985, the Court 
. . . Loss of the oppo1iunity to appeal is itself sufficient prejudice to suppo1i a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to appeal as 
requested. 
Ricca's application raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he 
communicated his intent to appeal to his counsel. If counsel did not pursue an 
appeal as directed by Ricca, Ricca suffered prejudice in the loss of his 
opp01iunity to appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal by the district 
comi with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by 
Ricca's application. We remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing where 
both Ricca and defense counsel, who represented Ricca in the underlying 
criminal case, may be called to testify. It will be necessary for the district comi 
to make a finding whether Ricca's desire to appeal was adequately 
communicated to his attorney and that the attorney's failure to file a direct 
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appeal resulted from deficient perf01mance. See, e.g. Sanders v. State, 117 
Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct.App. 1990). If the district court finds that 
ineffective assistance of counsel deprived Ricca of his opportunity to appeal, 
the proper remedy is for the district court to vacate and re-enter the judgment 
of conviction so that Ricca may perfect a timely appeal. Mata, supra. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This -Jf1:_ day of August, 2010. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE 
/If''-I, the undersigned, do hereby ce1tify that on the___::_ day of August, 20 I 0, a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, and 
transmitted, via facsimile, to the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
(208) 436-3177 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. CV-2010-79 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Procedural Bac!<ground 
The Petitioner (hereafter "Mr. Zepeda") entered an Alford plea of guilty to the 
offense of grand theft by possession of stolen property, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-
2403( 4 ), in Minidoka County case CR-2009-2284. On October 5, 2009, the court 
sentenced Mr. Zepeda to a total period of confinement of eight years, with three years 
determinate and five years indetenninate. Mr. Zepeda filed an appeal on October 26, 
2009. The appeal is pending. 
Mr. Zepeda filed his petition for post-conviction relief on February 5, 2010, 
claiming evidence not previously presented and ineffective assistance of counsel. He 
also filed a motion for appointment of counsel which the court granted. On July 7, 2010, 
the State filed the instant Motion for Summary Dismissal. Mr. Zepeda filed his Objection 
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on July 15, 2010 and his Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Objection to Motion for 
Summary Dismissal (hereafter "Memorandum") on August 10, 2010. 
Discussion 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in 
nature. Stale v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 ( 1983). An 
application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, 
however, and must contain much more than a "short and plain statement of the claim" 
that would suffice as a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 
813,816,892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The summary dismissal of a post-eonviction action is permissible when the 
petitioner fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in his or her favor, 
would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. LC. § 19-4906; Murphy v. State, 143 
Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.Jd 741, 747 (Ct. App. 2006). "If the applicant ... fails to present 
evidence making a prima facie case . . . establishing each element of the claim, then 
summary dismissal is appropriate. The applicant's factual showing must be based upon 
evidence that would be admissible at [an evidentiary] hearing." Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Bare or conclusory allegations, 
unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary 
hearing. Kingv. Stale, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Mr. Zepeda raises several claims in his petition for post-conviction relief. The 
claims are examined separately below, consistent with the standards applicable on a 
motion for summary dismissal. 
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A. Evidence of Material Facts Not Previously Presented 
Mr. Zepeda alleges the existence of material facts not previously presented in the 
fonn of a letter from Brian R. Card that is attached as an exhibit to Mr. Zepeda's 
Memorandum. By this letter, Mr. Card states that Mr. Zepeda had no knowledge that the 
property (a car) was stolen because Mr. Card allegedly told him that the car was 
registered, insured, and legal. Mr. Zepeda contends that this letter raises a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether or not he knew that the car in his possession was stolen. 
When a petitioner bases a post-conviction petition on the ground of evidence of 
material facts not previously presented, the court examines the claim under the standard 
for a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdict. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 
723, 932 P.2d 348, 351 (1997). A new trial based on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence is warranted only where the defendant shows: "(I) the evidence is newly 
discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it wiJI probably produce an acquittal; 
and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of 
the defendant." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing 
State v. Drapeau, 91 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)). Evidence into which 
the defense simply did not inquire does not constitute newly discovered evidence that 
would warrant a new trial. See id at 146, 191 P.3d at 224. 
In this case, Mr. Zepeda apparently knew of Mr. Card's statements and 
involvement at the inception of the case. Mr. Zepeda has not shown that this evidence 
was inaccessible or undiscoverable, even after an exercise of reasonable diligence. 
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Therefore, the letter from Mr. Card is not "newly discovered" simply because Mr. 
Zepeda's attorney allegedly chose not to contact Mr. Card earlier in the case. 
Regarding the materiality of the proffered evidence, Mr. Zepeda pied guilty even 
after denying that he had the requisite mental state to commit the crime. The court 
initially refused to accept Mr. Zepeda's plea on this basis, but allowed him to enter an 
Alford plea when he continued to express his desire to plead guilty. The issue of whether 
Mr. Zepeda had the requisite mental state to commit grand theft by possession of stolen 
property was not tested at a trial, nor was it an issue once Mr. Zepeda detennined that he 
would enter an Alford plea of guilty. Therefore, additional evidence at this stage 
regarding his lack of knowledge that the property was stolen is immaterial and 
cumulative. Further, Mr. Zepeda has not shown that Mr. Card's letter would have 
affected the outcome of this case or that he would not have pied guilty if the letter had 
been presented earlier. 
Mr. Zepeda has failed to meet his burden in showing a genuine issue of material 
fact that would entitle him to relief on the ground of evidence of material facts not 
previously presented. Therefore, this claim is dismissed. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must 
establish: l) that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and 2) there is a reasonable probability, that, but for counsel's errors, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different. LaBelle v. State, l 30 Idaho 115, 118, 
937 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (I 984). 
The second prong is a showing of prejudice to the petitioner resulting from his counsel's 
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deficient perfonnance. Where a defendant pleads guilty, the defendant must show that, 
but for the alleged errors of counsel, he or she would not have pied guilty. Remington v. 
State, 127 Idaho 443,446,901 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances 
of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
perfonnance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" and that 
counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 40 I, 406, 775 P .2d 1243 
(Ct. App. 1989); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (I 984). 
"The constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the 
prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case 
might have been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80,844 P.2d 706 (1992). 
In his Petition and Affidavit, Mr. Zepeda alleges that his attorney: (1) failed to 
contact Brian Card; (2) failed to arrange for a polygraph test; (3) failed to withdraw as 
counsel upon request; ( 4) failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea upon request; 
(5) failed to conduct adequate pretrial investigation; (6) failed to develop an "adversarial 
or fighting" attitude; and (7) failed to develop effective rapport with Mr. Zepeda. 
The only aspect of the attorney's performance addressed in Mr. Zepeda 's 
Memorandum is his attorney's alleged failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In support of this allegation, Mr. Zepeda provides a copy of a letter from his attorney, 
indicating that, after sentencing, Mr. Zepeda requested that his attorney file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. His attorney refused to file such a motion because he believed 
Mr. Zepeda's Alford plea of guilty was plainly voluntary. 
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Withdrawal of a properly entered guilty plea is "not an automatic right and more 
substantial reasons than just asserting legal innocence must be given." State v. Dopp, 124 
Idaho 481,486, 861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993) (overruling State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 532 
P.2d 926 (1975)). Mr. Zepeda has failed to provide substantial reasons beyond his 
assertion of legal innocence that would warrant a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
He has not shown that his attorney's refusal to file the motion was conduct that fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness or that there was a reasonable probability that 
such a motion would have been granted. 
All of the other allegations in Mr. Zepeda's Petition and Affidavit regarding his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are similarly bare and incomplete as to the 
elements of the claim. Mr. Zepeda has failed to meet his burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the performance of his attorney fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the outcome of his case would 
have been different if his counsel had performed effectively. Because he has not 
presented evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, an evidentiary hearing is not 
warranted and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Order 
For the reasons set forth above, the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is 
granted and Mr. Zepeda's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed in its entirety. 
~ 
It is so ORDERED this£ day of September, 20 l Ur.::==========::::::::::::::?J~-""'::::~:_-~ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER CV-20!0-79 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
The Right: The court hereby advises the Petitioner, of the right to appeal this Order 
within forty two ( 42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. 
14(a). 
In Fonna Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person 
who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in fonna pauperis, 
meaning the right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and 
the right to be represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ of ~ , , 2010, I served a true, 
correct copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION upon the following in the manner provided: 
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICE 
P. 0. Box l 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
( ) First Class Mail 
( ~and Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
( ~st Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
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' 
Greg J. Fuller 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box L 
161 Main Avenue West 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Telephone: (208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB # 1442 
ISB #7538 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COI.:RT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
***** 
Case No. CV-2010-0000079 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., by and through his attorney of 
record, FuUer Law Offices, and hereby requests that this Honorable Com1 reconsider it's 
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Decision and Order Granting State's Motion for Summary Dismissal for the following reasons: 
First of all, the Court has decided that :Petitioner does not have an automatic right to 
withdraw his plea of guilty, despite the fact that his plea was an Alford Plea and he had 
previously made asse1tions oflegal innocence. The Comt relies upon State v. Dopp, 124 
Idaho 481, 486, 861 P .2d 51, 56 (1993 ), stating the proposition that that case oveITules State 
v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975). Essentially, the Court stated that the 
Petitioner failed to provide substantial reasons beyond his asse1tion of legal innocence that 
would waITant a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
While I admit that State v. Dopp ce1tainly modifies State v. Jackson, I am afraid I 
must agree with Justice Bistline's analysis of State v. Jackson in his concurring opinion in 
Dopp. For the Court's convenience, and the fact that I believe that analysis is extremely 
relevant to issues in this case, I will restate the analysis as follows: 
While, in this one justice's view, the Court should not be "hesitant to reverse 
ourselves when a doctrine, a defense, or a holding in a case, has been proven 
over tie to be unjust or unwise," Salinas v. Vierstras, 107 Idaho 984, 990, 
695 P.2d 369, 375 ( l 985), the rule of State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 532 
P.2d 926 ( 1975), is neither unjust nor unwise. Thus, while there are occasions 
for oveITuling precedent, see State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987-998, 842 
P.2d 660, 666-78 ( 1992) (wherein the logical and factual flaws in the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule as well as the precedential and policy 
reasons for rejecting that rule were demonstrated, at length), this is not one of 
them Accordingly, 1 disagree with the majority's decision to oven-ule State v. 
Jackson, although I concur in the result of the opinion because of the 
prospective only application of today's holding. 
Justice Johnson who dissented in part in Guzman perfotmed an admirable 
service in synthesizing this Comt's decisions regarding the doctrine of stare 
decisis when he said that 
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[f]rom these "precedents" we can glean that prior decisions of 
this Com1 should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or 
have proven over time to be unjust or unwise. While I am 
prepared to accept these limitations on the rule of stare decisis, 
I am not prepared to allow these limitations to convert the 
precedents of this Com1 into ephemeral edicts that are here 
today and gone tomorrow, the duration of their lifespan 
dep4ending on the composition and disposition of the Com1. 
This is not to say that I am unwilling to overrule precedent that 
is manifestly wrong. 
122 Idaho at 1001, 842 P.2d at 680. Similar sentiments were earlier 
expressed in a specially concuning opinion by the author of today's State v. 
Dopp majority opinion. In a scholarly, well written, infmmative, and "in-depth 
review of the legal principal of stare decisis, " Justice McDevitt concluded that 
"[ w ]hile it may seem that stare decisis is a rule of convenience, it is not. I 
believe this rule requires us to stand by our prior decisions unless there are 
compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate a depai1ure from our prior 
rulings." State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 
( 1991), ( Mc Devitt, J., specifically concuning). It is not unreasonable to believe 
that Justice Trout and Justice Pro Tern. Woodland have an equally high regard 
for the doctrine of stare decisis as do Justices McDevitt and Johnson, but their 
views on the subject matter have not yet been advanced, and may later surface 
in the Idaho and Pacific Reporters. 
Given the recent and fervent adulation at the altai· of stare decisis it might be 
expected that the majority opinion would make an offering which would 
forcefully demonstrate how State v. Jackson was "manifestly wrong" and wold 
additionally establish the "compelling and cogent reasons" which are needed in 
order to depai1 from our prior rulings. Instead, the majority's explanation of 
why Jackson must be oven-uled is as "ephemeral" as that case itself now 
appears to be. 
Initially, it should be noted that this is not an example of a single aben-ant case 
existingoutsidethemainstreamofthe law. In that case, theoveirulingoftherogue 
case wold be more of a housekeeping matter and thus not subject to the "unjust 
or unwise" test. Here, to the contrary, a.review of the Idaho cases cited by the 
majority shows those cases ai·e consistent with and do not undermine the Jackson 
rule. InStatev, Lavy, 121 Idaho 842,828 P.2d871 (1992), the defendant did 
not enter an Alford plea, and the motion to withdraw was made after he was 
sentenced. Thus, I.CR. J3(c) required a.showing of"manifest injustice." In 
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Jackson, a showing of manifest injustice was not required because the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea was made prior to the sentencing. State v, ]\If artinez, 8 9 
Idaho 129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965), involves the same factual situation as Lavy. 
Although State v. Hawkin, 117 Idaho 285, 787 P.2d 271 (1990) and State v. 
Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 761 P.2d 1151 ( 1988), are pre-sentencing withdrawal 
cases, both are easily distinguishable fromJackson. First, neither Hmvkins nor 
BallardisanAlfordpleacase. Second, in both cases, the state would have been 
severely prejudiced if the motion to withdraw the plea had been granted. In 
Hawkins, the guilty plea was entered twelve days into trial, and this Cout1 
carefully distinguished that case from cases like Jackson, where no trial had 
connnenced. In Ballard, the defendant absconded from the jurisdiction for three 
years after he entered his plea. There, the trial cout1 fond the state's case had 
been prejudiced by the defendant's voluntary absence. These cases do nothing 
to the vitality of Jackson becausetherewasnoshowing of prejudice to the state 
in Jackson and the case simply does not address that situation. 
In sho11, Jackson, is firmly in the mainstream of the law. Thus some "compelling 
and cogent reason" must exist to oveITule it. 
The majority, however, can muster only one infumreason why Jackson should be 
ovenuled, to wit: "the utility ofAlfordpleas will be severely reduced if defendants 
are permitted to withdraw them before sentencing for no additional reason." 124 
Idaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56. The careful reader might have stopped there and 
wondered how the utility of A !ford pleas could be reduced by adhering to the rule 
now in effect. This Justice was brought to ponder on that possibility. Would the 
utility of l11iranda warnings be severely reduced if the United States Supreme 
ComirefusedtoovenuleAfiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 ( 1966)? Ifso, would theutilityofi\-firanda warnings be increased 
if that case were overruled? Unless the laws of physics have been turned on their 
head ("for every inaction there is an equal and opposite "action"), a reasonable 
guess is that the utility of Alford pleas would remain the same if Jackson is not 
oveITuled. Any other conclusion, i.e., the majority's, is simply iITational. 
The maj01ity, apparently oblivious to the concept of cause an affect, blithely trips 
along to make the following statement: "[s]uch a holding [i.e. not ove1Tuling 
Jackson] might well lead to a reluctance on the pai1 of prosecutors and judges to 
agree to the acceptance of such pleas.'' Id, 124 Idaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56. 
According to the majority, "[t ]his would impair judicial efficiency by eliminating a 
useful procedure for the resolution of criminal cases; it would also work to the 
detriment of defendants." id. 
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As might be expected in this case, neither the State nor the majority has ponited 
to one iota of evidence, either empirical or anecdotal, about what the effect of 
Jackson has been on Alford pleas. However, I suspect that if the effect of 
Jackson is as pervasive and profound as the majority suggests, the Court would 
have heard about it sometime during the nearly twenty years which have lapsed 
since that case was announced. If the kind ofbaseless speculation engaged in by 
the majority is now all that is needed to overcome stare decisis, then an "open 
session" sign has been declared which can only tend to expose existing case law 
precedent to unwan-anted attacks. 
This justice would not ove1Tule Jackson because there is no reason, much less a 
"compelling and cogent reason,'' to do so. 
Additionally, because Jackson is soundly premised upon solid constitutional 
considerations, and because Jackson protects the accused's right to a jury trial 
along with the other constitutional rights appurtenant thereto it should remain 
unmolested. The tights created by the United States Constitutional exist to check 
the power of the state and thereby protect every citizen's liberty. The minor 
inconvenience borne by trial courts and the state in cases like Jackson and Dopp' s 
case now before us, is so inconsequential that no sensible person would subvert 
those fundamental and cherished rights merely to avoid such a minor annoyance. 
Ironically, it is the majority who now creat4es a "harsh mandate" by holding that 
a claim of actual innocence is not a substantial enough reason to withdraw a guilty 
plea even if that motion is made p1ior to sentencing and there is no prejudice to the 
state. What must be kept firmly in mind is that an assertion of innocence is the 
most substantial reason for a trial which a person can advance, notwithstanding the 
majority's trivialization of that concept. 
Instead of ovenuling cases ''willy nilly," the majority should temper today's opinion 
and "course a less strident vein under the auspices" of stare decisis. 
However, it would appear that the Cou11 feels that State v. Dopp does, indeed, ove1rnle 
State v. Jackson and, if that is the case, the Petitioner in this case would have to provide other 
substantial reasons beyond his mere assertion oflegal innocence in order to have withdrawn his 
plea of guilty. Of course, Petitioner has alleged the existence of material facts not previously 
presented in the fo1mof a letter from Brian R. Card, which basically indicates that the Petitioner 
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had no knowledge that the property in question was actually stolen because he, Mr. Card, had told 
him that the car was registered, insured and legal. Petitioner contended that this letter did raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether or not he had knowledge that the car was stolen, an issue 
directly related to establishing the existence ofnonexistence of the necessary intent to justify the 
charge. 
Petitioner also provided a copy of a letter from his attorney indicating that he had requested 
that his attorney file a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Evidently, his attorney refused to file 
this motion because he believed Petitioner's Alford plea was plainly voluntary. 
As to the newly discovered evidence, i.e., the letter from Brian Card, the Comi has ruled 
that any additional evidence regarding his lack of knowledge that the property was stolen is 
immate1ial and cumulative, and that the letter involving Mr. Card has not been shown to effect the 
outcome of this case, or shown that Petitioner would not have pied guilty if the letter had been 
presented earlier. However, while the Comi may conclude that the additional evidence provided 
by Petitioner would not have affected the outcome of the case, this evidence certainly does provide 
a substantial reason beyond Petitioner's asse1iion oflegal innocence which would absolutely 
wanant a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
In fact, it is these two issues that provide the basis for the Comi 's granting of the State's 
Motion for Summary Disposition. The important thing to remember is the only question at issue 
in this case was whether the Petitioner presented enough evidence that would raise genuine issues 
of material fact such that summary dismissal would not be appropriate. The genuine issues of 
material fact in this case are whether the Petitioner should have been allowed to withdraw his plea 
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of guilty because he provided substantial reasons beyond his assertion oflegal innocence that would 
wanant granting a motion to withdraw his plea. These substantial reasons are represented by the 
letter and statements of Mr. Card, which was attached to Petitioner's Memorandum, and the letter 
from his attorney indicating that he knew that Petitioner wished to withdraw his plea and that 
Petitioner had communicated that to him. 
In State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 801 P.2d 1308 (1990), the Com1 stated: 
It follows that a court, in addressing a withdrawal motion, must consider not only 
whether the defendant has asserted his innocence, but also the reason why the 
defenses now presented were not put forward at the time of original pleading. 
In the principal case, the defense attorney simply declined Petitioner's request to withdraw 
his plea of guilty, or to present the statement from Mr. Card as possible evidence. Why he did 
that, or did not do that, can only be determined with a hearing on the matter. 
The only question here that is not discussed in the Court's opinion is whether the wish to 
withdraw the plea of guilty was communicated to the lawyer prior to sentencing or after sentencing, 
thereby greatly affecting the burden necessary on the pati of Petitioner to prove his case. And, 
equally important in this matter, is the effect the letter from Mr. Card would have had in establishing 
the main element of the crime in chief, i.e., Petitioner's intent at the time he took possession of the 
property. 
The Com1 has simply taken the position that this evidence is either immaterial and 
cumulative, or insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the pe1fon11ance 
of his attorney fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the outcome of the case 
would have been different if counsel had perfo1med effectively. 
MEMORANDUM - 7 
77 
As to the issue of when Petitioner's wish to withdraw his plea of guilty was made, i.e., 
before or after sentencing, Petitioner plainly states in his Affidavit attached to his original Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief that p1ior to sentencing he moved to withdraw his plea. This statement, 
along with the letter from his attorney, indicating that he also contacted his attorney in writing to 
withdraw his plea, although the writing was after sentencing, is an important issue because it 
establishes the burden necessary on the part of Petitioner to support his position that he was denied 
due process. 
If there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court should have assumed that Petitioner's 
allegation that he advised his attorney to withdraw his plea before sentencing was true. 
In State v. Parrott, 117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258 ( 1990), the Court stated: 
On appeal, this Court must decide whether the State's summary disposition motion 
was properly granted. This requires that we view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the petitioner, and detennine whether they would entitle him to relief 
if accepted as true. Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct.App. 
1987); Wolfe v. State, 114 Idaho 659, 759 P.2d 950 (Ct.App. 1988) (petition 
for review denied, December 8, 198 8). While this requires that the petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations be accepted as true, we are not required to accept the 
petitioner's conclusions. Kmftv. State, 100 Idaho 671, 603 P.2d 1005 ( 1979). 
The point here is that the very evidence that the Court has ruled either immate1ial or 
inadequate, and, in any case, inadmissible, is the very evidence going to the most important issue 
of all, i.e., Petitioner's right under all of these circumstances, to withdraw his plea of guilty and to 
try the case on the me1its. 
In short, the Court's interpretation of Dobb that it oveITules State v. Jackson does not 
justify the Court's granting of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal for the reasons that the 
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veiy evidence considered by the Court to be irrelevant to a t1ial in this matter ( the Court apparently 
didn't feel it would make any difference in the outcome), certainly does create a triable issue of fact 
as to whether there are substantial reasons beyond the Petitioner's assertion ofinnocence that 
would warrant a withdrawal of Petitioner's plea of guilty, thereby givinghima1ightto ajuryt1ial. 
The case of Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (App. 1993), draws an 
appropriate analogy of the situation in the principal case, although it does deal with appeal rather 
than a withdrawal of plea motion. In this regard, consider the following: 
Loss of the oppo11unity to appeal is itself sufficient prejudice to supp011 a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to appeal as requested. 
Ricca's application raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he 
communicated his intent to appeal to his counsel. If counsel did not pursue an 
appeal as directed by Ricca, Ricca suffered prejudice in the los ofis oppo1iunity 
to appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal by the district court with respect 
to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Ricca's application. We 
remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing where both Ricca and defense 
counsel, who represented Ricca in the underlying c1iminal case, may be called to 
testify. It will benecessaiy for the district court to make a finding whethei· Ricca's 
desire to appeal was adequately communicated to his attorney and that the 
attorney's failure to file a direct appeal resulted from deficient pei-formance. See, 
e.g., Sanders v. State, l 17 Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct.App. 1990). If the 
dist1ict court finds that ineffective assistance of counsel deprived Ricca of his 
oppo11unity to appeal, the proper remedy is for the district comi to vacate an re-
enter the judgment of conviction so that Ricca may pei·fect a timely appeal. A:J a ta, 
supra. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This ';)..3~ September, 2010. 
FlJLLER LAW OFFICES 
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I, the undersigned, do hereby ce11ify that on the~y of September, 2010, I caused 
a tme and coITect copy of the foregoing document to be mailed, United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, and transmitted, via facsimile, to the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
(208) 436-3177 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. CV-2010-79 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The Petitioner (hereafter "Mr. Zepeda") entered an Alford plea of guilty to the 
offense of grand theft by possession of stolen property, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-
2403(4), in Minidoka County case CR-2009-2284. On October 5, 2009, the court 
sentenced Mr. Zepeda to a total unified period of confinement of eight years, with three 
years determinate. Mr. Zepeda filed an appeal on October 26, 2009. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals issued an unpublished opinion on September 8, 2010, amending a prior 
unpublished opinion, which affinned Mr. Zepeda's judgment of conviction. 
Mr. Zepeda filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the present case on 
February 5, 2010, claiming evidence not previously presented and ineffective assistance 
of counsel. On July 7, 2010, the State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The court 
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granted the State's Motion on September 8, 2010. Mr. Zepeda filed the instant Motion 
for Reconsideration on September 22, 2010 and his supporting Memorandum on 
September 24, 2010. 
Upon review, Mr. Zepeda' s Motion for Reconsideration is denied without a 
hearing. The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007). 
The legal standards and reasoning applicable in this case are set forth in the 
court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal dated September 8, 2010. This court previously considered the letters from 
Brian Card and Mr. Zepeda's attorney that were submitted with Mr. Zepeda's Objection 
to the Motion for Summary Dismissal. However, Mr. Zepeda did not present a genuine 
issue of material fact sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing and his Petition was 
bare or incomplete as to the elements of his claims. 
At this stage, Mr. Zepeda's Motion for Reconsideration does not provide new 
facts or admissible evidence to support the allegations in his Petition. Although Mr. 
Zepeda makes additional arguments regarding the significance and relevance of the 
letters referenced above, the court is satisfied that its September 8, 2010 grant of 
summary dismissal was appropriate. For the above reasons, Mr. Zepeda's Motion for 
Reconsideration is hereby denied. 
ORDER 
lt is so ORDERED this/ Z~ay of October, 2010. / 
-+1--L 
CV-2010-79 
) ~· / / -----------Uclf t---:,) 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
. 
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RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEA VE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
The Right: The court hereby advises the Petitioner, of the right to appeal this Order 
v.ithin forty two ( 42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. 
l 4(a). 
In Fonna Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person 
who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in fonna pauperis, 
meaning the right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and 
the right to be represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / ~ of 03 (~~{~(___ , 2010, I served a true, 
correct copy of the ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
upon the following in the manner provided: 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICE 
P. 0. Box L 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr. #36287 
Idaho Correctional Institution, Orofino, C2 
Hospital Drive North #23 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
( ) First Class Mail 
( 1.}ffand Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
( i.{First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
( ~;st Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket 
( ) Facsimile 
Clerk of the District Co}lrt, 
, / . • / I , 
By C . ( { L{.. {1 
';/ Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 
84 
10/20/2010 16:39 
Greg J. Fuller 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box L 
161 Main. A venue West 
Twin Falls, JD 83303 
Telephone: (208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB #1442 
ISB #7538 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
JOSE U.JIS ZEPEDA, JR., 
Plaintiffi' Appellant, 
vs. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
* * * * * * * 
) 
) Case No. CV-2010-00079 
) 
) NOTICE OE APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PAGE 01/04 
TO: The State ofldaho and its attorney, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney 
General, Lance Stevenson, Minidoka County Prosecutor, and to the Clerk of the 
above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: 
L Th.e Appellant, Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., appeals against the Respondent to the Tdaho 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal file stamped .in the above~entitled action on the 811, day of September, 
20 l 0, the Honorable Michael R. Crabn·ee presiding, and the Order Denying Petitioner's 
Motion for Reconsi.deration file stamped in the above-entitled action on the 12th day of 
October, 2010, the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree presidi.ng. 
2. The Appellant bas a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
or Order descnbed .in. paragraph l above is an appealable Order under and pursuant to I.AR. 
11 (c)(l ). 
3, A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
(a) Whether or not the District Court erred in granting the State's Motion for Summruy 
Disposition. 
(b) Whether or not the District Court erred in denying the Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration, 
4. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portion of the reporter's 
transcript 
The entire standard reporter's transcript of all recorded hearings. 
5. '17i.e Appellant requests the documents included in the clerk's record automatically 
under Rule 28, I.A.R. No Order has been entered sealing al] or any part of the record or 
transcript. 
NOTJCE OF APPEAL - 2 
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6. I certify: 
( a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the repo1ier. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been not paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the designated Reporter's Transcript as the Defendant has filed an Ex-Pmie 
Motion for Appointment of Appellate Public Defender. 
(c) That the Clerk of the District Court has not been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the designated Clerk's Record as the Defendant has filed an Ex-Paiie Motion 
for Appointment of Appellate Public Defender. 
( d) That all applicable appellate filing fees have been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all pmiies required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and also upon the Attorney General of the State ofldaho. 
~ 
DATED This _2J:[:_ day of October, 2010. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
rneys for PlaintiffAppellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the ,JlJL-day of October, 20 I 0, a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage paid to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83 720 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Court Reporter 
Minidoka County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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Greg J. Fuller 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box L 
161 Main A venue West 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Telephone: (208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB #1442 
ISB #7538 
Attorneys for Plaintif£1 Appellant 
" I ,. 
,- " 1· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
* * * * * * * 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR, ) 
) Case No. CV-2010-00079 
Plaintif£1 Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
) APPOINTMENT OF ST A TE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
* * * * * * * 
COMES NOW Jose Luis Zepeda, Jr., above-named Plaintif£1Appellant, by and 
through his attorney of record, Greg J. Fuller, and hereby moves this Honorable Com1 for an 
Order pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-867, appointing the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office to represent said Plaintif£1Appellant in all fm1her appellate proceedings and 
allowing counsel for Plaintiff to withdraw as counsel of record. This Motion is made and based 
upon the grounds and for the reasons that the Plaintiffi'Appellant is cmTently incaicerated and is 
indigent; the State Appellate Public Defender's Office is authorized by statute to represent the 
Plaintiffi' Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings; and it is in the interests of justice for them 
to do so in this case since the PlaintiID Appellant is indigent and any further proceedings on this 
case wi11 be appeals. 
~ 
DATED This <).(} day of October, 2010. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
eys for Plaintiffi' Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
" .: L-,/ 
I, the undersigned, hereby ce1iify that on the~ day of October, 2010, a true and 
con-ect copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage paid to: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
I 
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Greg J. Fuller 
Daniel S. Brown 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. BoxL 
161 Main A venue \Vest 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Telephone: {208) 734-1602 
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606 
ISB #1442 
ISB #7538 
Attorneys for PlaintifflAppellant 
C:..: . .. I 
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l 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A.'1\i'D FOR THE COUNTY OF wllNIDOKA 
******* 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR., ) 
) Case No. CV-2010-00079 
Plaintiffl Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) EX-PA.RTE ORDER FOR 
) APPOINTtvfENT OF STATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) APPELLATE PlJBLIC DEFE~'DER 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
******* 
BASED L"PON the Ex-Pa.rte Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public 
Defender filed by Plaintif£1 Appellant, and good cause appearing therefore; 
EX-PA.RTE ORDER- 1 
91 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-867, that the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office is hereby appointed to represent said Plaintiffi' Appellant in 
all fmiher appellate proceedings and counsel for the Plaintiff is hereby allowed to withdraw as 
counsel of record. 
___ ,4, 
DATED This)_) day of October, 2010. 
EX-PARTE ORDER- 2 
:MICHAEL CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 26th day of October, 2010, she caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing EX-PARTE ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER to be served upon the following persons by 
depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka Co. Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID. 83350 
Supreme Court 
Appeals Dept. 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0101 
Court Reporter 
Maureen Newton 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID. 83350 
Certificate of service 
Lawrence Wasden 
State Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720-0010 
Molly Huskey 
State Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID. 83 703 
Dated this 26"_ d~October, 2010 
i~~ 
"'Santos Garza, Deputy Cle ' 
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Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
DUANE SMITH, CLERK 
Attn: SANTOS 
DAHO Cou~T Of APPEALS 
2Qi j I O'/ -4 . . i f " k 1' ; (' -, 
- - ... 
Lll' . . J•' 'l- - • I 
-· , \ 
/1' · 1· 
---r.-:u. ___ , '-'L- • u' y 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
MINIDOKA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PO BOX 368 
RUPERT, ID 83350 
CLERK'S RECORD DUE DATE SET 
Docket No. 38199-2010 JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR. Minidoka County District Court 
v. STATE OF IDAHO #2010-79 
The CLERK'S RECORD must be filed in this office by JANUARY 5, 201 I. 
11/03/2010 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
* * * * * * 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR. , 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Minidoka ) 
)SUPREME COURT NO. 38199-2010 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
District Court# CV-2010-79*D 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
RECORD 
I, DUANE SMITH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction, and 
is a true and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required 
under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 20TH day of 
October, 2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
- I -
DUANE SMITH 
Clerk of the District Court 
f\ t1 
By: .Ao.-0~:::':::> ·~!e:::::v '7 
Santos Garza, Deputy C~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
* * * * * * * * 
JOSE LUIS ZEPEDA, JR. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) Supreme Court No. 38199-2010 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
District Court No. CV-2010-79*D 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
SERVICE 
I, Santos Garza, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Transcript on Appeal and the 
Clerk's Record to each of the parties or their attorney ofrecord as follows: 
Lawrence Wasden, Esq. 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Molly J. Huskey 
IDAHO STA TE APPELLATE PUBLC DEFENDER 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83 703 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court in Rupert, Idaho, the ;;)lt day of N lJv~-~ , 2010. 
DUANE SMITH 
Clerk of the District Court 
\ ::__\ 
By: s~~~o;~ ~~~:~\kr 
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